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Abstract
The fear of being stigmatized or socially sanctioned governs many aspects of hu-
man behavior. We show the existence and consequences of stigma in an important
area of public health concern: mental health. Comparing self-reports to adminis-
trative data records, we find that survey respondents under-report mental health
conditions 36% of the time when asked about diagnosis and about 20% of the time
when asked about prescription drug use. Survey respondents are significantly less
likely to under-report other conditions. This behavior is consistent with a model
in which mental illnesses are stigmatized and agents have incentives to hide such
traits. Differential under-reporting of mental illnesses is correlated with character-
istics that also predict a lower probability of mental health treatment, suggesting
that stigma can play an important role in determining health-seeking behavior.
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1 Introduction
The fear of being stigmatized or socially sanctioned and disgraced governs many aspects
of human behavior. In many cases, the fear of stigma does not result in actual behavior
change but rather leads individuals to simply hide certain behaviors or actions (for ex-
ample, smoking in secrecy). This is in line with the definition of stigma in the seminal
work on the topic by Goffman (1963): i.e., that stigma results in a “spoiled identity,”
which is the result of a deviance from social norms, and therefore leads an individual to
be discredited by society. In this instance, “the social label of deviance compels stigma-
tized individuals to view themselves and others to view the stigmatized as discredited
or undesirable” (Mahajan, Sayles, Patel, Remien, Ortiz, Szekeres, and Coates, 2008).
Because fear of stigma leads individuals to hide their behaviors or characteristics, empir-
ically quantifying the existence of stigma poses a challenge. Despite the centrality and
importance of stigma in influencing human behavior, formal treatments of it in economics
have been limited.1 However, it is commonly agreed that stigma exists and influences
behavior in many spheres.
We show the existence and consequences of stigma in an important area of public health
concern: mental health. In 2012, 18.6 percent of all U.S. adults had a recent mental
illness;2 the prevalence of mental illness is similar in other developed countries. Studies
show that public knowledge about mental health illnesses has recently increased, but con-
siderable stigmatization of individuals with mental health illnesses remains; for example,
mental illness is ranked near the bottom of other illnesses in terms of public acceptance
(Hinshaw, 2007). As a result, the negative effects of stigma have been hypothesized to
be as harmful as the direct effect of mental disorder (Hinshaw, 2007). According to the
U.S. Surgeon General report, stigma is the main barrier to mental health care: “It de-
ters the public from seeking, and wanting to pay for, care” (U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, 1999). Hence, stigma could prevent individuals from seeking care
(Corrigan, 2004), leading to more intense (and perhaps less successful) and expensive
treatment options later (Kupfer, Frank, and Perel, 1989).
1The papers that do examine stigma have largely concentrated on explaining low program take-up in
cases where there are obvious benefits to individuals like welfare and food stamps (Moffitt, 1983; Besley
and Coate, 1992; Blumkin, Margalioth, and Sadka, 2014). Despite the large literature in this area, it
is difficult to formally test the stigma hypothesis as there are competing explanations for low program
take-up, such as transaction costs or information constraints (see Currie (2004) for an excellent review).
A small theoretical literature has examined the role of stigma in shaping individual behavior in issues
such as crime and divorce (Furuya, 2002; Blume, 2002; Ishida, 2003).
2http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/prevalence/any-mental-illness-ami-among-adults.
shtml
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In line with Goffman’s definition of stigma, we build a simple model in which agents
that have traits that are stigmatized by society want to hide these traits from others.3
In particular, agents face costs if traits that are stigmatized are revealed publicly, but
they also face costs for not reporting truthfully. However, in each situation where the
agent is asked about whether she has a certain stigmatized condition (an example is a
survey), she is unable to determine whether her answer will be made public (i.e., privacy
concerns). Hence, coarse perception regarding the cost of truthful reporting can generate
relatively greater misreporting for traits that are stigmatized, even on surveys where
anonymity is assured.4 We show evidence of this “hiding” behavior for mental health
problems by comparing survey self-reports on diagnoses and mental health drug use to
administrative data on prescription drug use. While there could be various drivers for the
differences between survey self-reports and administrative data, our leading explanation is
that if mental illnesses were not stigmatized, the difference between self-reported survey
responses and objective administrative records should be statistically similar to other
diseases. Our operational definition of stigma is quite broad, and aggregates causes such
as shame, guilt, self image, and concerns for social discrimination (thereby also including
taste and statistical basis for such discrimination), but we are able to specifically separate
out labor market discrimination concerns.
We find that approximately 36% of individuals whom we observe with a diagnosis of
depression self-report as not having a mental disorder. The degree of misreporting is
lower when individuals self-report prescription drug use for depression (20%). In contrast,
people under-report other diagnoses, such as cardiovascular diseases and diabetes, about
17% of the time (14% in the case of self-reported prescription drug use). These differences
are statistically significant. Our sample is unique in that about 25% of the population
are migrants to Australia. When examining the degree of under-reporting by country of
origin, our results suggest that individuals from Asia and the Middle East are more likely
to under-report relative to individuals from Northern Europe or the Americas. There is
also a steep age gradient in misreporting, with older people more likely to misreport than
younger people. Males are more likely to misreport compared to females.
We provide suggestive evidence that stigma is likely to play a role in the decision to seek
treatment by examining the characteristics of people who self-report as having mental
3Our model is adapted to the survey setting, but is comparable to the public good contribution
model of Benabou and Tirole (2011).
4Our results are also evidence of stigma if we alternatively assume that agents are fully aware of the
costless nature of the survey (that no one will ever re-identify the agent’s responses to the survey). In
this case, misreporting on a survey is driven by self-image issues, which ultimately are generated by a
notion of stigma (see, for example, Be´nabou and Tirole (2011) on self-signaling and self-image). Under
this assumption, we are unable to distinguish between self-image and stigma because our data does not
allow us to assess individual perceptions over the costliness of the surveys. We develop this idea more
formally in Section 2.
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health issues according to a commonly used measure (the Kessler Psychological Distress
scale), but do not seek mental health treatment in the subsequent 12 months. The over-
lap of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that predict both under-reporting
conditional on seeking care and not seeking care conditional on a high probability of
having mental health problems, is suggestive of the role that stigma plays in preventing
health care seeking.
We recognize that not all forms of hiding behavior or trait concealment are the result of
stigma. For example, individuals might lie on a survey given by an employer by showing
extra years of experience or misreporting other information, including mental health
history, to get a higher wage or a promotion. This sort of strategic reporting could be
motivated by an individual’s concern of stigma as well as labor market discrimination (if
persons with a mental health disorder are indeed less productive on the job). Our results
are interpretable as evidence of stigma in mental health if we assume that the labor market
discrimination motive in misreporting is similar across various diseases, such as diabetes
or hypertension; hence, the relative excess misreporting in mental health is evidence of
stigma. Importantly, our sample consists of a large number of nonemployed individuals,
mainly retirees, for whom we can plausibly claim that the labor market discrimination
motive is weak; hence, for this subsample, our reliance on the homogeneity of the labor
market discrimination motive is mitigated.
There could also be a general concern about survey reporting error that is driven by
inattention, recall, lack of clear communication between doctors and patients etc. (see
Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001) for a comprehensive list). Such general expla-
nations for differences in survey and administrative data records lead us to test a few
observations. First, these general explanations might result in all diseases and conditions
being under-reported to a similar extent. This is contradicted by the data. Second, dif-
ferential misreporting remains when we change the recall window over which we compare
survey reports to administrative data, suggesting that simple recall issues are not driving
our results. Third, our results are robust to analysis that is akin to a fixed-effect model:
an individual who is treated for both cardiovascular disease and depression, for example,
is much more likely to under-report his mental health condition relative to his heart con-
dition. Fourth, doctor fixed effects regressions leave the results largely unchanged; hence,
doctor-specific communication strategies are not driving our results. Finally, while some
anti-depressants might be used for conditions other than depression, institutional insur-
ance reasons and other robustness tests that we pursue suggest that this is extremely
unlikely to be driving our results.
While a large and vibrant literature in psychology and psychiatry has examined the ex-
istence of stigma in mental health (see examples in Corrigan (2000)) the approach of
using relative misreporting of mental health in a heterogenous sample of about a quarter
4
of a million individuals, is novel.5 Our work also complements a recent set of papers
in economics that focus on stigma in the case of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
(Thornton, 2008; Derksen, Muula, and van Oosterhout, 2014; Hoffmann, Fooks, and
Messer, 2014; Ngatia, 2011).6 Using randomized control trials, these papers highlight
the role of incentives, information, and social networks in understanding and mitigating
the negative consequences of HIV-related stigma. We add to the economic literature on
health-related stigma by showing the existence of stigma in mental health using adminis-
trative data and by directly showing “hiding” behavior, which is one of the consequences
of stigmatized traits. Our results on heterogeneity in hiding (under-reporting) and how
stigma might affect health-seeking behavior are additional contributions in this space.
Our paper is also related to other papers that match self-reported health measures to
administrative health records. An excellent example of such work is Baker, Stabile, and
Deri (2004) where self-reports of specific ailments are compared to administrative med-
ical records in Canada to better understand the use of self-reported “global wellbeing”
measures. However, the data they use does not contain information on mental health,
nor do they have self-reported data on prescription drug use, both of which are central to
our analysis. More recently, work by Johnston, Propper, and Shields (2009) shows mis-
reporting in hypertension using data from England. However, it is unclear in their study
whether there is any strategic or stigma-driven misreporting; because the objective mea-
sures of hypertension are gathered after self-reports of hypertension have been collected,
individuals may not be aware of hypertension, as it is often asymptomatic (Johnston,
Propper, and Shields, 2009). In a review of papers comparing self-reports to medical
data, Harlow and Linet (1989) find that most papers focus on reproductive health; no
examples of such comparisons in the mental health space are cited.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature examining the degree of misreport-
ing in other government programs and in surveys in general.7 In a general review of
measurement error in surveys, Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001) discuss the possi-
5Some recent work examines misreporting in mental health related visits to general practitioners
(GPs), such as Palin, Goldner, Koehoorn, and Hertzman (2011). However, the sample size used in Palin,
Goldner, Koehoorn, and Hertzman (2011) is quite small, and misreporting of visits for reasons other
than mental health is not examined. Rhodes, Lin, and Mustard (2002) document misreporting of mental
health in a larger sample of individuals, however, they too, do not examine misreporting in other health
conditions. Using administrative data and cross sectional data from Taiwan, Wu, Lai, Gau, Wang, and
Tsai (2014) report match rates between self reports and medical claims records, but mental health and
depression is not a focus of their work.
6There is certainly a broader, multidisciplinary set of papers on the issue of stigma in HIV. See
Mahajan, Sayles, Patel, Remien, Ortiz, Szekeres, and Coates (2008) for an excellent review.
7Almada, McCarthy, and Tchernis (2015) provide some excellent examples of such work in the case
of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). For example, Marquis and Moore (2010)
show the extent of under-reporting of SNAP receipt in the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) by comparing self-reports to administrative records. See also Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009)
for measures of under-reports in other transfer programs in the United States.
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bility of “social desirability” influencing how data could be misreported. Thus, our paper
adds evidence to this literature on measurement error in surveys by providing evidence
on misreporting along an important variable of public health concern; by contrasting
with other diseases, we also posit a possible mechanism (stigma) for systematic excess
under-reporting for socially undesirable traits. In that sense, this paper is related to
the literature seeking to document and understand social desirability bias using other
methods in different settings (Coffman, Coffman, and Ericson, 2013).
2 Misreporting due to stigma
We construct a simple model of stigma and choices in the face of stigma. Each individual
i privately observes whether he has a designated condition. We denote bi = 0 if individual
i does not have the condition, and bi = 1 if he has the condition.
The individual is faced with one of multiple situations (surveys) in which he is queried
about his status with respect to this condition. We denote the set of possible situations
by S, and a specific situation by sj. The cardinality of S, denoted |S|, is at least 2. We
assume that any one of these situations is equally likely—i.e., each of these situations
occurs with probability 1|S| .
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The individual is free to misreport his status. Denote the response of the individual by bˆi.
This response may either be publicly revealed, or not. If the individual is in situation sj,
his response bˆi is publicly revealed if a variable rj that he does not observe equals 1, and
is not revealed if this variable equals 0. There is a true probability pij ∈ [0, 1] that rj = 1.
This probability is a composite assessment of the probability of several possibilities that
the individual must consider: the probability that the report in the situation is explicitly
made public (for example, an answer to a question in a public forum is overheard), the
possibility that even an anonymous response is later re-identified, etc.9
The individual’s ex-post payoff is a function of his private type bi, his reported type bˆi,
and whether his report is revealed; i.e., rj—formally, we denote his ex-post payoff by
ui(bˆi, bi, rj). Because the individual does not know the realization of rj at the time he
makes his report, and instead only knows the situation he is in, we denote by Ui(bˆi, bi, sj)
his assessment of his options in situation sj, given the fact that his true status is bi.
We make three assumptions about the agent’s payoffs. The first two assumptions struc-
ture how the agent evaluates ex-post outcomes (ui), while the final assumption concerns
how he aggregates these ex-ante (Ui).
8It is straightforward to generalize this to cover other distributions.
9See the survey by Heffetz and Ligett (2014) for several famous instances of the latter.
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Firstly, we assume that having the condition is “stigmatic.” In other words, we assume
that if the individual reports having the condition (bˆi = 1) and this report is revealed
publicly (rj = 1), then the individual suffers some cost ci > 0. This cost is a reduced
form assessment of the individual’s perception of harm that he will suffer if his report of
having this condition is revealed.
We posit two sources of cost—the first, cdi , is his assessment of the cost of labor market
discrimination he would suffer—e.g., reduced/lost wages, forgone employment opportuni-
ties etc. The second, csi , is stigma—e.g., psychological cost (embarrassment, lost prestige,
etc.) or social (the fact that the individual suffers this condition becomes a part of his
identity, causing losses during interactions with other individuals, as outlined in Akerlof
and Kranton (2000)). To this end we can decompose
ci = c
d
i + c
s
i . (1)
Secondly, we assume that lying is costly to the individual. In other words, if the individual
reports bˆi 6= bi, he suffers a cost di. This cost in turn can be interpreted in two ways. The
first is that this cost is purely psychological—i.e., it is a cost of the cognitive dissonance
that results from misreporting one’s true status.10 The second is akin to ci—i.e., just as
ci is the individual’s assessment of the cost when he has the condition, di is the social cost
that will accrue to him were it revealed that he had misreported his condition status. We
are agnostic here as to the source of this cost—though, as we show below, it is important
for our interpretation that di > 0.
Note that these two assumptions amount to
ui(bˆi, bi, rj) = −ciχ{bˆi=rj=1} − diχ{bˆi 6=bi},
Finally, we assume that the agent is an expected utility maximizer. However, we assume
that assessing the probability of the information being revealed in any individual situation
is not possible for this agent. Instead, we assume that he uses a composite probability of
revelation, p¯i in his assessments:
p¯i =
1
|S|
∑
sj∈S
pij.
In other words, the individual averages out the probability of disclosure across situations.
We posit this is an artifact of the individual’s inability to assess the exact probability of
disclosure that he is facing in his specific situation. This may be a result of insufficient
10For a classic reference see Festinger and Carlsmith (1959).
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data known to the agent about past disclosures in each of these situations, which causes
him to “coarsen” and use the aggregate probability as a more reliable summary statistic
(Al-Najjar and Pai, 2014). Alternately, it may be a result of cognitive shortcomings
(Mullainathan (2002), Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Shleifer (2008), Schwartzstein
(2014)) that cause him to be unable to discern the exact situation he is in and to therefore
average over some class of situations.
This assumption implies that:
Ui(bˆi, bi, sj) = Ep¯i[ui(bˆi, bi, sj)].
Given our assumptions on the payoff of the individual, some simple observations follow:
Observation 1. Any individual i who does not have the condition (i.e., bi = 0) reports
his status truthfully, regardless of the situation he is in (bˆi = 0).
This is straightforward: note that lying comes at a cost (di), but if the agent does not
have the condition, then lying confers no benefit. However, while someone without the
condition always reports his status truthfully, someone with the condition may choose to
hide his condition.
Observation 2. An individual i with the condition (i.e. bi = 1) misreports his status
(bˆi = 0) whenever
cip¯i > di, (2)
i.e., only if the (dissonance) cost of lying (di) is less than the expected loss from revealing
the condition.
A couple of comparative statics drop out fairly immediately from (2). First, the mag-
nitude of misreporting costs di matters—in the absence of any misreporting costs, in-
dividuals always misreport their condition status, even if the cost ci or probability of
disclosure is infinitesimally small. Second, the coarse perception of the agent may cause
misreporting in situations that have a “low” probability of disclosure.
Observation 3. Suppose an individual i is faced with a situation sj such that the
pij < pij′ for any sj′ ∈ S. Then, for an appropriate level of dissonance cost di, it can be
the case that:
cip¯i > di > cipij.
In other words, there are settings where (counterfactually) an agent who is able to discern
the situation he is in would not choose to hide his conditions, as he assesses the probability
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of disclosure as too low to be worth the dissonance cost. However, his coarse perception
causes him to overestimate the probability of disclosure and hence misreport his condition.
Finally, note that an agent with higher costs ci will misreport whenever an agent with
lower costs does, ceteris paribus. For example, fixing the cost from labor market discrim-
ination, cdi , and increasing the stigma c
s
i will result in more misreporting. To see this,
combine (1) and (2) to observe that an agent with the condition misreports whenever
(cdi + c
s
i )p¯i > di.
To summarize, this theory provides simple predictions about the nature of reporting in
the face of stigma that are borne out in our data: Firstly, coarse perception of the risk of
disclosure leads individuals to misreport their status even in anonymous surveys where
the risk is “low.” Secondly, while individuals who have the condition may choose to hide
it (i.e., under-report), agents who do not have the condition will not choose to misreport
that they suffer from the condition (i.e., they will not over-report). Finally, fixing the
labor market discrimination cost faced by an individual, higher stigma costs lead to more
misreporting.
3 Data and methods
For the empirical analysis, we use a unique data set from Australia constructed by linking
the Sax Institute’s 45 and Up Study data to the individual medical records. The 45 and
Up Study is a survey of more than 250,000 individuals 45 years of age or older residing
in New South Wales (NSW), the most populous state of Australia. The sample is drawn
from the database of Australia’s public health insurance program, Medicare, which covers
all citizens and permanent residents of Australia. People 80 years of age or older and
residents of rural and remote areas are oversampled. Information from the 45 and Up
Study participants was collected via mail questionnaires in stages from 2006 to 2009.
Most of the questionnaires (78%) were completed in 2008. Close to 18% of the sent-
out questionnaires were returned, resulting in the sample of 267,153 individuals (about
11% of the NSW population aged 45 years and over). The 45 and Up sample is broadly
representative of the populations of NSW and Australia in terms of most demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, and employment), but
there is positive selection on household income (Johar, Jones, and Savage, 2012).
The prevalence of health conditions in the 45 and Up Study sample is comparable to
that in other nationally representative surveys. Close to 19% of the 45 and Up Study
respondents report a lifetime diagnosis of depression or anxiety. In The 2007 National
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Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing, 15% of the respondents aged 45 or more report
that they had been diagnosed with a mental health disorder at some point of their lives
and have experienced symptoms of that disorder in the past 12 months (Australian Bureau
of Statistics, 2008).11 As to other conditions, the life-time prevalence of cardiovascular
diseases and diabetes in our data is 42% and 9%, whereas the corresponding figures in the
National Health Survey (NHS) 2007-08 are 35% and 9% (Australian Bureau of Statistics,
2009).12
For the analysis, we use the data covering the period of 2007-2010 (233,081 observations),
because the questions on mental health were not asked in 2006. After excluding a small
number of invalid observations (volunteers and individuals younger than 45) and obser-
vations with missing values of key variables, the sample contains 215,618 individuals.
Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of demographic and socioeconomic
variables in our analysis sample. The sample individuals are on average 63 years old.
Males constitute 46% of the sample. Almost three quarters of the sample have European
ancestry, and only half identify themselves as Australians. Close to 25% of the individuals
have a university degree. Because our sample is older, a large proportion of the sample
(38%) are retired. The sample individuals live in relatively well-off areas, as measured
by the SEIFA Index of Relative Socioeconomic Advantage and Disadvantage (SEIFA):
close to 30% of observations are in the top SEIFA quintile, and less than 10% are in the
bottom SEIFA quintile.
The 45 and Up Study, with the consent of all the participants, is linked to the individuals’
administrative health records, including the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) and
the Medicare Benefits Schedule (MBS) databases. At least five years of administrative
records are available for all individuals in the sample, starting September 2005 and ending
August 2010. For the analysis of misreporting of mental health, we mainly use the linkage
of the 45 and Up Study to the PBS database.
The PBS database includes all filled drug prescriptions covered by Medicare, with an
exception of the drugs that cost less than the co-payment paid by the patient. For
the general public, the co-payment varies from A$30.70 to A$32.90 during our analysis
period. For the individuals who hold a health care concession card, the co-payment is
substantially lower (from A$4.90 to A$5.20). Once the total amount spent on prescription
drugs reaches a set amount (Safety Net threshold13), individuals without a concession card
are also eligible for the lower co-payment for the rest of the calendar year. Most of the
drug purchases recorded in the PBS data are made using a health care concession card
11Since the prevalence estimate based on the 45 and Up Study is not conditional on the presence of
symptoms in the past 12 months, it is expected to be higher.
12The prevalence rates of health conditions in the NHS are expected to be somewhat lower, because
they are based on current health conditions.
13The Safety Net threshold varies from A$1,059 to A$1,265 during the analysis period.
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(83% of all drugs and 77% of mental health drugs). The eligibility for a health care
concession card is linked to welfare benefit receipt, veteran status, low income, and/or
senior age. Thus, if there is heterogeneity in stigma-related misreporting of mental illness,
our results are more informative of misreporting in the sub-population that is older and
less advantaged.
3.1 Measuring under-reporting
In the first part of our analysis, we investigate the extent of under-reporting of mental
illness by matching self-reported mental health information in the 45 and Up Study to
the administrative records of filled prescriptions for mental health disorders. We use two
types of self-reported measures of mental health from the 45 and Up study.
First, individuals are asked whether a doctor has ever told them that they have a list
of health conditions, including mental disorders (see Appendix Figure B.1). In the ad-
ministrative records, we can observe whether an individual has filled any prescriptions
for depression drugs from the start date of the administrative records until the survey
date. The drugs for depression are identified using the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical
(ATC) codes, listed in Appendix A.1. To evaluate the extent of under-reporting of mental
illness, we calculate the proportion of individuals whom we observe filling prescriptions
for depression drugs, but who do not report that they have been diagnosed with depres-
sion or anxiety.14 We also compute the under-reporting rates of other health conditions:
cardiovascular diseases (hypertension, heart disease, and stroke) and diabetes (Appendix
A.1 lists ATC codes used to identify these conditions in the administrative data).
Second, in the 45 and Up Study, individuals are asked about their use of selected pre-
scription drugs in the past four weeks (see Appendix Figure B.2 for the precise survey
question). The survey question includes three drugs most commonly used for the treat-
ment of depression.15 These drugs account for more than half of the total depression drug
sales in Australia (Mant, Rendle, Hall, Mitchell, Montgomery, McManus, and Hickie,
2004). Almost half of all prescriptions for depression drugs in the PBS data were for one
of these drugs. We create an indicator variable that takes the value one if an individual
reports taking any of the three depression drugs in the past four weeks and the value
zero otherwise. We use the administrative records to determine whether an individual
filled a prescription for any of the three depression drugs in the past month. The drugs
are identified in the administrative records using a drug-specific ATC code (more details
provided in Appendix A.1). We then calculate the under-reporting rate of depression
14Anxiety disorders are often treated with depression drugs (AMH, 2015).
15Zoloft (sertaline), Cipramil (citaloprim), and Efexor (venlafaxine).
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drugs as a proportion of the individuals observed filling a prescription for any of the
three depression drugs who do not report using any of these drugs in the survey.
We also estimate the under-reporting rates of drugs used for treatment of the follow-
ing other conditions: cardiovascular and blood diseases (hypertension, congestive heart
failure, high blood cholesterol, and thrombosis), diabetes, and other diseases (heartburn,
gout, and thyroid disease). As in the case of depression drugs, the other drugs included in
the survey question are the drugs that are commonly used to treat these conditions. For
example, around half of all prescriptions for hypertension and diabetes drugs were for the
drugs included in the survey question. This proportion was higher for cholesterol (81%),
heartburn (73%), gout(85%), and thyroid (94%) drugs. The higher “market share” of
the latter drugs compared to depression drugs may raise a concern that individuals may
be more familiar with these drugs and therefore report their use more accurately. To
address this concern, we have re-estimated the average under-reporting rate of the other
drugs, excluding cholesterol, heartburn, gout, and thyroid drugs, and found consistent
results.
Comparing the two self-reported measures of mental health, we expect individuals to be
more likely to under-report mental illness diagnosis, because the survey questions directly
asks whether they have been diagnosed with a mental disorder. Individuals may be less
likely to under-report depression drug use because the question on prescription drug use
does not specify that these are depression drugs. Another reason why the under-reporting
rate of depression drug use may be lower is that the question about prescription drug use
is more specific than the question about diagnoses.
4 Results
Table 2 presents the estimated under-reporting rates of mental disorders and other condi-
tions. Panel A of Table 2 shows that 36.5% of people observed using depression drugs in
the administrative data do not report that they have been diagnosed with either depres-
sion or anxiety. The average under-reporting rate of all other diagnoses is substantially
lower at 17%. Diabetes has the lowest under-reporting rate (11%). Panel B of Table
2 reports the under-reporting rates of prescription drugs. The under-reporting rate of
depression drugs is equal to 20%. The under-reporting rates of the other drugs are lower
(13%-14%) and significantly different from the under-reporting rate of depression drugs
at the 1% significance level. Overall, the results presented in Table 2 suggest that the
stigma of mental illness can lead to substantial under-reporting of mental disorders in
the survey data.
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Table 2 shows that for both mental illness and other conditions, under-reporting is lower
when individuals are asked about their drug use rather than about their diagnoses. The
under-reporting rate of mental health drugs is lower by almost a half compared to the
under-reporting rate of mental illness diagnosis. For the other conditions, the differences
are smaller than for mental illness. A likely explanation for the lower degree of mis-
reporting of drugs compared to diagnoses is the substantially shorter time frame (past
four weeks versus lifetime). Moreover, the specificity of the question about prescription
drug use might prompt some survey responders to examine their drug purchases/receipts
rather than rely solely on memory. In the case of mental illness, the differences in the
wording of the questions may matter as well, as discussed in Subsection 3.1. These find-
ings suggest that the framing of survey questions may affect truthful reporting of mental
illness and other conditions.
Table 3 examines under-reporting for a subset of people who use multiple drugs. This
analysis is akin to an individual fixed-effects model. For example, we take an individual
observed as taking drugs for both depression and diabetes, and examine the relative
excess under-reporting of mental illness for the same individual.16 Column 2 in Table
3 shows that among people who take both drugs, mental illness diagnosis and drug use
is under-reported 45% and 22% of the time, respectively, whereas diabetes diagnosis or
drug use is under-reported only 14% of the time. Hence, the excess under-reporting of
mental illnesses remains and is robust to such individual comparisons. The results are
similar for individuals who take depression, hypertension, and diabetes drugs (Column
3).
4.1 Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection, we explore alternative explanations besides stigma for our results.
First, we address the possibility that our results are driven by doctor, rather than patient,
behavior. Some doctors might be unclear at communicating the specifics of illnesses to
their patients. Under the assumption that doctors are equally unclear at communicating
all types of illnesses to their patients, Table 4 presents the results of a doctor fixed-effects
specification (we can uniquely identify the prescribing doctor in the administrative data).
The main takeaway from this table is that for both, diagnosis and prescription drug use,
doctor fixed-effects do little to alter the results. Hence, doctor specific communication
issues are not likely to drive the main results.
A more nuanced issue with regards to communication between doctors and patients is that
doctors might be particularly unwilling to “label” their patients as being “depressed.” Ac-
16Note that prescription drug frequencies are the same for all conditions in the data; all drugs have
to be taken daily.
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cording to the “Australian Guidelines for Medical Practitioners on Providing Information
to Patients”, a doctor can withhold information from the patient only under exceptional
circumstances (National Health and Medical Research Council, 2004). Doctors treating
depression patients are recommended to take patient preferences into account when pre-
scribing antidepressant treatment (Ellis and Smith, 2002). In practice, however, doctors
might not follow these guidelines. Empirically, the doctor fixed effects specification does
not solve this issue.
To explore this possibility further, we examine whether doctor fixed effects are jointly
significant in explaining the relative excess under reporting observed for mental illness
diagnosis. We restrict the sample to the individuals who were treated for both depression
and cardiovascular disease by the same doctor, and the doctors who treated two or more
such patients (14,838 patients, 4,192 doctors).17 We then regress the difference in under-
reporting of depression and cardiovascular disease diagnosis on individual demographic
and socioeconomic (SES) characteristics (age, gender, ethnicity, education, employment,
and local area SES) and doctor fixed-effects. Doctor fixed-effects are jointly insignificant
in this regression, suggesting that doctor communication style is not driving differential
under-reporting of mental illness relative to other conditions (F-statistic = 1.010, p-value
= 0.345). Thus, we believe that doctor behavior is not a leading candidate in explaining
our results.
Second, individuals may not recall that they have been diagnosed with a mental illness.
This is unlikely in our setting as we only focus on recent treatments for depression.
Moreover, if we only use the data on the prescription drug use in the past 12 months, the
under-reporting rate of depression is 32% and the under-reporting rate of other conditions
is 15%. Related, we investigate how the estimated under-reporting rates of mental illness
and other diagnoses vary with treatment intensity. Individuals who use prescription
drugs for a given condition rarely or irregularly may be more likely to forget about their
diagnosis. The results are presented in Figure 1. In Graph A, treatment intensity is
measured by the number of prescriptions filled from the start date of the administrative
records to the survey date, and in Graph B, it is measured by the duration of the longest
treatment spell (in months). For both measures of treatment intensity, we find that
under-reporting of mental illnesses indeed decreases with higher treatment intensity, but
so does under-reporting of other conditions. Among individuals who have been treated for
depression for short periods of time, the under-reporting rate of mental illness diagnosis
is higher than 50%. Among those who have been treated for depression for relatively long
periods of time, the under-reporting rate of mental illnesses is close to 20%. Importantly,
17In this subsample, the under-reporting rates are comparable to those in the full sample: 40% of
individuals under-report mental illness and 19% under-report cardiovascular disease with the difference
statistically significant at the 1% level.
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individuals are more likely to under-report mental illness compared to other conditions,
irrespective of treatment intensity.
Another recall related concern is that some patients may be treated with multiple depres-
sion drugs before an effective drug is found. This might lead mental health patients to
be more uncertain of the exact type of drugs they are currently taking and more likely to
misreport in the survey. We address this concern in Table 5 by comparing under-reporting
rates for patients who do not switch drugs in the 6 months prior to the survey to patients
who switch. Our headline results from Table 2 are largely replicated in Column 1 of this
table, showing that drug switching is not driving our results. While the misreporting for
switchers is higher (Column 4), the sheer number of switchers are small relative to the
overall sample.
It might also be the case that mental health drugs have more generic options than other
drugs, and hence cause issues with remembering exact drug types. We discuss this in
detail in section A.1.2 in the Appendix, and conclude that this is not an issue in this
context since mental health drugs and other drugs have similar shares of generic options.
Finally, we tackle the issue of multiple uses for depression-related drugs. Depression drugs
may be prescribed for the treatment of other conditions besides depression or anxiety.
Depression drugs can be used to treat depressive episodes of bipolar disorder (AMH,
2015). A patient prescribed a depression-related medication, might be taking it for con-
ditions related to physical pain. For example, diabetic neuropathy is one such condition
(Goodnick, Jimenez, and Kumar (1997) and Sindrup, Grodum, Gram, and Beck-Nielsen
(1991)). We show that this is not a major concern for us for four principle reasons. First,
while this would be a relevant worry if we only compared questions about self-reported
diagnosis to prescription drug use, it is not a concern when we compare self-reported pre-
scription drug use to administrative reports on drug use. Second, Australian insurance
rules regarding reimbursement are quite strict—most common antidepressants are only
covered by insurance if they are prescribed for depression.18 Third, in Table 6 we show
that our results are not affected by excluding patients who take antipsychotic drugs, which
are used to treat bipolar disorder. Fourth, in Table 6, we also show our results are robust
to the removal of any antidepressant prescribed by a neurologist who typically handles
cases related to neuropathic pain. Finally, the most dominant form of antidepressants
that are prescribed for chronic pain are tricyclic antidepressants (McQuay, Tramer, Nye,
Carroll, Wiffen, and Moore, 1996). The under-reporting rate of mental illnesses decreases
from 36% to 27% when we exclude patients taking tricyclic antidepressants, but it still is
substantially higher than the under-reporting rate of the other conditions. Note that this
may be a conservative estimate, because tricyclic antidepressants have worse side effects
18For example, sertraline (Zoloft) can only be prescribed for major depressive disorders: http://www.
pbs.gov.au/medicine/item/2236Q-2237R-8837D-8836C, page accessed on April 14th, 2015.
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than other antidepressants and are prescribed for severe depression when other drugs do
not work (AMH, 2015); thus, they may be most under-reported.
A few minor concerns related to survey design remain. Specifically, we had to decide
how to treat individuals who leave the question about diagnoses blank—that is, they
do not report that they have been diagnosed with any of the conditions listed in the
survey question, but they also do not select the option “none.” In Table 2, we count
them as non-reporting any of the conditions; thus, these individuals contribute to the
estimated under-reporting rates of diagnoses. In Appendix Table B.1, we present the
under-reporting rates of diagnoses when these individuals are, instead, omitted from the
sample. The re-estimated under-reporting rate of mental illness diagnosis decreases, but
only slightly so (to 34%), as do the under-reporting rates of other diagnoses.
Another minor concern is related to the ordering of drugs in the survey question on
prescription drug use. As Appendix Figure A.1.2 shows, depression drugs are placed at
the very end of the question box. While this might cause these variables to be under-
reported due to survey fatigue, we note that this question is one of the first questions in
the survey on medical history of the patient; moreover, the drug question on diabetes is
the question just prior to the ones on depression.
4.2 Over-reporting
We can also examine “over-reporting” of prescription drug use.19 We define over-reporting
rate as the proportion of individuals who report taking a particular drug in the sur-
vey who are not observed purchasing this drug in the administrative data.20 Stigma in
mental health should not lead to any over-reporting; instead, we hypothesize that any
over-reporting is likely due to survey inattention, lack of doctor-patient communication,
recall biases, etc. Given that these potential reasons for over-reporting are not unique
to mental illness, we also hypothesize that over-reporting should not be systematically
higher or lower for mental illness compared to other conditions. In Appendix Table B.2,
we examine over-reporting of prescription drug use and find that depression drugs do
get over-reported, but at nearly the same rate as other drugs. Hence, over-reporting of
depression drug use is likely due to general survey errors.
19We cannot analyze over-reporting of diagnoses, as not all diagnoses result in medication being
prescribed (whereas all prescription medications require diagnosis).
20To perform this analysis, we restrict the sample to “concessional” individuals, for whom we observe
full prescription drug purchase history. An individual is defined as “concessional” if he/she has filled at
least one script using a Health Care Concession Card in the past 12 months from the survey date.
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4.3 Heterogeneity and Mental Health Care Seeking Behavior
4.3.1 Heterogeneity
In this subsection, we first analyze whether under-reporting of depression drug use varies
by the severity of mental illness. We use the dose of a drug as a proxy for the severity of
mental illness. The treatment of depression usually starts with a lower dose of a drug. If
the low-dose treatment is not effective, the dose is increased.21 The relationship between
disease severity and under-reporting of mental illness can go both ways. On the one hand
more severe patients may be more likely to under-report mental illness, because they feel
more stigmatized (Hinshaw, 2007). On the other hand, if more severe patients face higher
costs of hiding their mental illness, they will be less likely to under-report. We test these
hypotheses in Table 7, in which we present under-reporting rates of depression drugs by
the dose of a drug. Appendix A.2 explains how we define “low” and “high” dose.22 The
results show that low-dose depression drugs are under-reported at a higher rate than
high-dose depression drugs. This finding is unlikely to be driven by the variation in recall
by dose, because we do not find the same pattern for the other drugs.
Individuals who take a lower dose of a drug may not only be less severe patients, but
also be diagnosed with depression more recently.23 Recently diagnosed patients may be
more likely to hide their mental illness than patients with a longer history of depression,
some of whom adapt to their illness and feel less self-stigma. To get further insights in
the results, we divide depression patients into two groups by the length of treatment (12
months or less (25%) versus more than 12 months (75%)). Table 7 shows the following:
(1) for both groups of patients, under-reporting of high dose drugs is lower; (2) under-
reporting of both low- and high-dose drugs decreases with the length of treatment. Taken
together, these findings suggest that (1) more severe depression patients may indeed find
it more costly to hide their illness, and (2) more recent mental health patients may feel
more stigma.
Our data also allows us to examine heterogeneity in under-reporting by demographic
characteristics. Studies on internalized stigma do not agree on whether stigma varies
by such characteristics as gender, age, education, employment, and ethnicity (Livingston
and Boyd, 2010). For example, results on heterogeneity by gender are mixed, with some
studies finding that men feel more stigmatized than women and other studies finding the
opposite. Most studies find that the perception of stigma decreases with age, although
21http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/Antidepressant-drugs/pages/introduction.aspx
22Out of 5,810 individuals who take depression drugs, close to 50% take a low dose of a drug, 35%
take a high dose of a drug, and for the rest we cannot determine the dose.
23The data confirms this, a smaller proportion of new depression patients (25%) take high-dose de-
pression drugs compared to patients who have been treated for depression for longer (50%).
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there are studies with contrary findings. All studies that find a significant relationship
between socioeconomic status and perceived stigma report that more educated and em-
ployed individuals are less likely to feel stigmatized than less educated and nonemployed
individuals. Finally, there is evidence that non-Caucasian individuals are more likely
to feel stigmatized than Caucasian individuals. We investigate whether there is varia-
tion in under-reporting of mental illness by these characteristics and also whether these
characteristics in general correlate with under-reporting of other conditions.
Figure 2 shows that in our data, under-reporting of mental illness diagnosis increases
sharply from age 55 to 75 and then levels off, while the under-reporting rate of depression
drug use does not vary with age until 65 and then starts increasing. This pattern may
reflect generational changes in attitudes to mental health. In Figure 3, we compare under-
reporting of mental illness by gender and education. Males are more likely to under-report
mental illness than females, irrespective of education level. Under-reporting of mental
illness is lower among university graduates.
In Table 8, we analyze the differences observed in the raw data more formally by re-
gressing the indicator for not reporting a mental health condition (Column 1) or drug use
(Column 2) on gender, age, SES, and ancestry, conditional on taking depression drugs any
time before the survey (Column 1) or in the past 4 weeks (Column 2). The results of the
regressions are consistent with Figures 2 and 3. We find that under-reporting of mental
illness increases with age. Males and individuals without university degree are found to
be significantly more likely to under-report mental illness. Controlling for other charac-
teristics, we do not observe significant differences in under-reporting of mental illness by
employment (except for the unemployed being more likely to under-report depression drug
use). However, there is a negative local area SES gradient in under-reporting of mental
illness. We find some interesting results on ethnicity. Individuals from Asian, African, or
Middle Eastern ethnic backgrounds are significantly more likely to under-report mental
illness, especially mental illness diagnosis, whereas having European ancestry decreases
the probability of under-reporting mental illness. We wish to highlight that the results on
gender and ethnicity are specific to mental illness and that these characteristics are not
correlated in the same way with under-reporting of all conditions (see Appendix Table
B.3).
4.3.2 Health care seeking behavior
We next examine whether characteristics associated with mental illness under-reporting
also predict health-seeking behavior.24 An individual is defined as receiving “mental
health treatment” if he is prescribed depression/anxiety drugs or is treated by a men-
24To perform this analysis, we need to make some sample restrictions, described in Appendix A.3.
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tal health professional (psychiatrist or psychologist), as per the administrative medical
records. The information on the visits to a mental health professional comes from the
MBS data. All medical services covered by Medicare are recorded in the MBS data,
including general practitioner (GP) and specialist visits. Medicare does not cover psy-
chologist visits for the general population, but patients with a diagnosed mental disorder
are eligible to receive compensation for a limited number of psychologist visits (starting
1 November 2006). Close to 3% of all individuals in our sample have visited a mental
health professional in the past 12 months.
We first identify individuals who are deemed to be in “need” of mental health treatment
according to the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10), as explained in Appendix
A.3 (n = 1, 620). We use the results from Table 8 to predict the probabilities of under-
reporting mental illness diagnosis and mental health drug use for these individuals. We
then examine whether these predicted probabilities are correlated with treatment-seeking
behavior in the subsequent 12 months. The underlying hypothesis is that characteristics
that correlate with under-reporting conditional on seeking treatment should also predict
lower probability of seeking treatment. On average, about 18% of this selected sample
receive treatment for mental health in the subsequent 12 months, i.e., we observe that
they use depression or anxiety drugs (or visit a mental health professional, but visits to
mental health professionals are substantially less common than drug use). Importantly,
we account for concerns about general “access” to health services and propensity to
seek health care by controlling for the number of GP visits in the past 12 months and
presenting results on GP visits as well. The concerns about access to health care are also
reduced, because for the individuals in our sample, the co-payment for prescription drugs
is close to zero (see Appendix A.3).
Table 9 presents the results. Consistent with our initial hypothesis that stigma might play
a role in preventing health care seeking, we find that individuals with a higher predicted
probability of under-reporting are also less likely to seek mental health care (even though
they are more likely to seek care from a GP). A 100% increase in the probability of mis-
reporting on the diagnosis question reduces the probability of seeking mental health care
by 16.5 ppt (the corresponding number for under-reporting on the prescription question
is even larger at nearly 26 ppt). In contrast, we do not find a statistically significant
association between the probability of under-reporting other health conditions (columns
3 and 6 of Table 9) and mental health care seeking. Thus, the results on mental illness
under-reporting are not driven by general tendency of certain individuals to under-report
their health conditions. In Table B.4, we further examine which particular characteristics
are driving the results presented in Table 9. Consistent with the heterogeneity results on
under-reporting of mental illness, we find that the probability of seeking mental health
treatment decreases with age, although older people have more GP visits overall. Simi-
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larly, Asian, African, or Middle Eastern individuals are less likely to receive mental health
treatment, although they visit a GP more often. We also find that men are less likely
to receive mental health treatment than women, but men also have fewer GP visits than
women.
In addition to discouraging individuals from seeking mental health treatment, mental
health stigma can reduce the likelihood that mental health patients, especially new pa-
tients, continue treatment for the required amount of time. To investigate the effect of
mental health stigma on adherence to treatment, we first identify “new” mental health
patients by limiting the sample to the individuals who did not take depression drugs in
the past 7-12 months before the survey date and filled at least 3 scripts for depression
drugs in the past 6 months. As dependent variables we use indicators of filling at least
one script for depression drugs in the next 0-3 months, 4-6 months, 7-9 months, and
10-12 months.25 We regress these indicator variables on a binary variable that indicates
whether or not an individual reported ever being diagnosed for depression or anxiety in
the survey as well as personal characteristics listed in Table 8 and year effects. Panel A
of Table 10 presents the results of these regressions, which show that individuals who do
not report their mental illness diagnosis in the survey are 12-13 ppt less likely to continue
taking depression drugs in the next 12 months. The results remain robust if we take into
account anxiety drug use (panel B of Table 10). In Appendix Table B.5, we show that the
results are even stronger when we restrict the sample to the new mental health patients
who have been taking depression drugs continuously for 3 months before the survey date.
In this sub-sample of new patients, the under-reporting of mental illness decreases the
probability of adherence to treatment by 13-23 ppt. Since treatment with depression
drugs usually lasts 6 months or longer and lower adherence by under-reporting new pa-
tients is observed already immediately after the survey date, our findings are unlikely to
be explained by the correlation between severity of illness and under-reporting. Overall,
the results are suggestive that the stigma of mental illness may affect not only reporting
of mental illness but also seeking and adhering to mental health treatment.
5 Conclusion
Conditional on taking prescription medication, we find that individuals are much more
likely to under-report diagnosis and prescription drug use regarding mental health ail-
ments, compared to other conditions. We interpret the additional misreporting in mental
health as evidence of the stigma of mental health issues. Our simple model posits that if
25We have also used the count of filled scripts and obtained similar results, which can be provided
upon request.
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mental health concerns are seen as an undesirable trait in society, people are more likely
to hide them, even when the costs of truthfully reporting are quite low.
Our interpretation of misreporting as evidence of stigma is based on a broad definition
of stigma. It is perhaps natural to think of stigma as taste-based discrimination (people
dislike others with depression), with the resulting costs. Since we only observe individual
agents’ reporting choices, we are unable to separate misreporting directly due to stigma
concerns from misreporting due to the agent’s intrinsic motivations such as guilt, shame,
self-image issues, etc. In our context, therefore, stigma is an amalgam of these forces. We
posit that these intrinsic motivations also arise indirectly from the same basic force—in
the absence of discrimination concerns, there is nothing to feel shameful/guilty about.
We do, however, attempt to separate this notion of stigma from concerns about labor
market discrimination—since a large portion of our sample is retired, we can assume that
for this sub sample there is no labor market based statistical discrimination motive in
their responses. In future work, we hope to shed light on the more nuanced differences
between discrimination concerns and the related intrinsic motivations mentioned above.
The most important facet of stigma that pertains to public health policy is the extent to
which it might prevent individuals from seeking appropriate care. Our results show that
stigma concerns play a significant role in determining health care seeking behavior in the
case of mental health. To the extent that policy or broader market forces can reduce
stigma in mental health, our conclusions suggest that this will lead to more individuals
seeking and obtaining treatment, and eventually lessening the burden of the disease.
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Figure 1: Variation in under-reporting rates of mental illness and other diagnoses by treatment
intensity.
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Notes: The under-reporting rate is estimated as the proportion of individuals observed
purchasing drugs for a given condition from Sep 2005 to the survey date who do not report
ever being diagnosed with this condition in the survey. In Graph A, treatment intensity is
measured by the total number of prescriptions filled, and in Graph B, it is measured by the
duration of the longest treatment spell (in months).
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Figure 2: Variation in under-reporting rate of mental illness and other conditions by age
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Notes: The under-reporting rate of mental illness diagnosis is estimated as the proportion of
individuals observed purchasing drugs for depression drugs from Sep 2005 to the survey date
who do not report ever being diagnosed with mental illness in the survey. The under-reporting
rate of mental health drug use is estimated as the proportion of individuals observed
purchasing drugs for depression in the past month who do not report using depression drugs
in the past 4 weeks in the survey. The lines in the graph represent the estimates of
Epanechnikov kernel-weighted local polynomial regression estimates. Top 1% of the age
distribution are excluded from estimations.
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Figure 3: Variation in under-reporting rate of mental illness by sex and education
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Notes: The under-reporting rate of the diagnosis of a given condition is estimated as the
proportion of individuals observed purchasing drugs for this condition from Sep 2005 to the
survey date who do not report ever being diagnosed with the condition in the survey. The
under-reporting rate of drug use is estimated as the proportion of individuals observed
purchasing drugs for a given condition in the past month who do not report using these drugs
in the past 4 weeks in the survey.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of key variables
Mean (sd)
A.Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics
Age 62.59(11.05)
Male 0.46
Ancestrya:
Australian/New Zealand 0.53
European 0.71
Asian 0.04
African/Middle Eastern 0.01
American 0.01
University degree 0.24
Employment status:
Self-employed 0.13
Employed for wages 0.35
Unemployed 0.02
Retired 0.38
Other 0.12
Local area SES (SEIFA Index):
1st quintile 0.10
2nd quintile 0.17
3rd quintile 0.24
4th quintile 0.21
5th quintile 0.28
B. Self-reported lifetime diagnoses
Depression/Anxiety 0.19
Cardiovascular diseaseb 0.42
Diabetes 0.09
C. Self-reported prescription drug use in past 4 weeks
Depression 0.04
Cardiovascular diseasec 0.38
Diabetes 0.05
Other conditiond 0.26
Observations 215,618
Notes : a Ancestry categories are not mutually exclusive, because respondents can select
more than one ancestry. b Hypertension, heart disease, or stroke. c Hypertension,
congestive high failure, high blood cholesterol, or thrombosis. d Heartburn, gout, or
thyroid problems.
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Table 2: The under-reporting rates of mental illness and other conditions
Under-reporting rate Difference from MI
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. na
A. Self-reported diagnoses
Mental illness 0.365 (0.003) - - 31,199
Other conditions: 0.169 (0.001) −0.196∗∗∗ (0.003) 94,188
Cardiovascular diseasesb 0.178 (0.001) −0.187∗∗∗ (0.003) 80,344
Diabetes 0.113 (0.003) −0.252∗∗∗ (0.004) 13,844
B. Self-reported prescription drug use
Mental illness 0.196 (0.005) - - 5,810
Other conditions: 0.136 (0.001) −0.059∗∗∗ (0.005) 108,045
Cardiovascular diseasesc 0.139 (0.001) −0.057∗∗∗ (0.005) 77,711
Diabetes 0.129 (0.005) −0.067∗∗∗ (0.007) 5,026
Other diseasesd 0.130 (0.002) −0.066∗∗∗ (0.006) 25,308
Notes : In panel A, under-reporting rate is estimated as the proportion of individuals
observed purchasing drugs for a given condition from Sep 2005 to the survey date who
do not report ever being diagnosed with this condition in the survey. In panel B,
under-reporting rate is estimated as the proportion of individuals observed purchasing
drugs for a given condition in the past month who do not report using these drugs in
the past 4 weeks in the survey. Standard errors (clustered at the individual level) in
parentheses. aUnit of observation is individual-condition. bHypertension, heart disease,
or stroke. cHypertension, congestive high failure, high blood cholesterol, or thrombosis.
dHeartburn, gout, or thyroid problems. ∗∗∗ indicates that the under-reporting rate of
the condition is different from the under-reporting rate of mental illness at the 1%
significance level.
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Table 3: Within-individual differences in the under-reporting rates of mental illnesses and
other conditions
MI & CVD MI & Diabetes MI, CVD, & Diabetes
(1) (2) (3)
A. Self-reported diagnoses
Mental illness 0.441 0.446 0.462
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
Cardiovascular diseasesa 0.213 - 0.202
(0.003) - (0.007)
[−0.227]∗∗∗ - [−0.260]∗∗∗
Diabetes - 0.140 0.133
- (0.006) (0.006)
- [−0.307]∗∗∗ [−0.329]∗∗∗
Observations 17,521 3,523 3,098
B. Self-reported prescription drug use
Mental illness 0.221 0.224 0.250
(0.010) (0.023) (0.030)
Cardiovascular diseasesb 0.144 - 0.149
(0.009) - (0.025)
[−0.077]∗∗∗ - [−0.101]∗∗∗
Diabetes - 0.142 0.144
- (0.019) (0.024)
- [−0.081]∗∗∗ [−0.106]∗∗∗
Observations 1,636 344 208
Notes : The sample consists of individuals who take drugs for mental illness as well as
cardiovascular disease and/or diabetes. MI stands for mental illness, and CVD for
cardiovascular disease. In panel A, under-reporting rate is estimated as the proportion
of individuals observed purchasing drugs for a given condition from Sep 2005 to the
survey date who do not report ever being diagnosed with this condition in the survey.
In panel B, under-reporting rate is estimated as the proportion of individuals observed
purchasing drugs for a given condition in the past month who do not report using these
drugs in the past 4 weeks in the survey. Standard errors in parentheses. The differences
between the under-reporting rates of respective condition and mental illnesses in square
brackets. aHypertension, heart disease, or stroke; bHypertension. ∗∗∗ indicates that the
under-reporting rate of the condition is different from the under-reporting rate of
mental illness at the 1% significance level.
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Table 4: Within-doctor differences in the under-reporting rates of mental illness and other
conditions
Difference from MI
Estimate S.E.
A. Self-reported diagnoses
Cardiovascular diseasesa −0.169∗∗∗ (0.002)
Diabetes −0.239∗∗∗ (0.003)
Observationsb 263,326
Doctors 17,955
B. Self-reported prescription drug use
Cardiovascular diseasesc −0.060∗∗∗ (0.005)
Diabetes −0.079∗∗∗ (0.007)
Other diseasesd −0.070∗∗∗ (0.005)
Observationsb 116,573
Doctors 9,495
Notes : In Panel A, under-reporting is defined as not reporting a diagnosis of given
condition in the survey conditional on purchasing drugs for this condition at some point
from Sep 2005 to the survey date. In Panel B, under-reporting is defined as not
reporting drug use for a given condition in the past 4 weeks in the survey conditional on
purchasing these drugs in the past month. Presented figures are estimates of prescribing
doctor fixed-effects regressions. Standard errors (clustered at the individual level) in
parentheses. aHypertension, heart disease, or stroke. bUnit of observation is
individual-doctor-condition. cHypertension, congestive high failure, high blood
cholesterol, or thrombosis. dHeartburn, gout, or thyroid problems. ∗∗∗ indicates that the
under-reporting rate of a condition is different from the under-reporting rate of mental
illness at the 1% significance level.
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Table 5: Variation in the under-reporting rates of prescription drugs by the number of
condition-specific drugs taken in the past 6 months
One drug More than one drug
Mean Diff. na Mean Diff. na
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mental illness 0.187 - 0.283 -
(0.005) - 5,280 (0.020) - 530
Other conditions: 0.134 0.053∗∗∗ 0.143 0.140∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.006) 77,478 (0.002) (0.020) 30,567
Cardiovascular diseases 0.136 0.051∗∗∗ 0.145 0.148∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) 52,298 (0.002) (0.020) 25,413
Diabetes 0.145 0.042∗∗∗ 0.117 0.166∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) 2,143 (0.006) (0.020) 2,883
Other diseases 0.128 0.059∗∗∗ 0.156 0.127∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) 23,037 (0.008) (0.021) 2,271
Notes : The under-reporting rate is estimated as the proportion of individuals observed
purchasing drugs for a given condition in the past month who do not report using these
drugs in the past 4 weeks in the survey. Standard errors (clustered at the individual
level) in parentheses. aUnit of observation is individual-condition.
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Table 6: Sensitivity of results to taking into account alternative uses of antidepressants:
under-reporting rate of mental illness diagnosis
Estimate S.E. n
Excluded observations:
Patients treated for bipolar disorder 0.375 (0.003) 29,548
Antidepressants prescribed by neurologist 0.359 (0.003) 29,967
Tricyclic antidepressants 0.271 (0.003) 23,240
All of the above 0.275 (0.003) 21,292
Patients on drugs that can cause depression 0.308 (0.004) 11,358
Notes : Under-reporting rate is estimated as the proportion of individuals observed
purchasing drugs for depression from Sep 2005 to the survey date who do not report
ever being diagnosed with mental illness in the survey. Standard errors (clustered at the
individual level) in parentheses.
Table 7: Variation in the under-reporting rates of prescription drugs by dose
Low dose High dose
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Mental illness:
All patients 0.237 (0.008) 0.145 (0.008)
Treated for ≤ 12 months 0.354 (0.017) 0.220 (0.028)
Treated for > 12 months 0.192 (0.009) 0.136 (0.008)
Other conditions:
All patients 0.135 (0.002) 0.144 (0.002)
Notes : The under-reporting rate is estimated as the proportion of individuals observed
purchasing drugs for a given condition in the past month who do not report using these
drugs in the past 4 weeks the survey. Standard errors (clustered at the individual level)
in parentheses.
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Table 8: Variation in under-reporting rate of mental illness by demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics.
Diagnosis Prescription drug use
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
(1) (2)
Age 0.013∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
Male 0.027∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.033∗∗∗ (0.011)
Ancestrya:
European −0.037∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.027∗∗ (0.012)
Asian 0.153∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.083∗ (0.045)
African/ Middle Eastern 0.100∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.062 (0.053)
American 0.080∗∗∗ (0.031) −0.020 (0.073)
University degree −0.070∗∗∗ (0.007) −0.045∗∗∗ (0.015)
Employment statusb:
Self-employed 0.008 (0.011) 0.011 (0.023)
Employed for wages 0.001 (0.008) 0.013 (0.015)
Unemployed −0.012 (0.015) 0.056∗∗ (0.026)
Local area SES:
2nd quintile −0.007 (0.010) −0.006 (0.018)
3rd quintile −0.011 (0.009) −0.011 (0.017)
4th quintile −0.016∗ (0.009) −0.023 (0.018)
5th quintile −0.024∗∗ (0.009) −0.043∗∗ (0.019)
Mean (dep var) 0.365 0.196
Observations 31,199 5,810
Notes : In Column 1, the sample consists of individuals who purchased depression drugs
at some time between the start date of the administrative records (1 Sep 2005) and the
survey date, and the dependent variable takes the value 1 if an individual does not
report ever being diagnosed with mental illness in the survey and the value 0 otherwise.
In Column 2, the sample consists of individuals who purchased selected depression
drugs in the past month, and the dependent variable takes the value 1 if an individual
does not report using these drugs in the past 4 weeks in the survey and the value 0
otherwise. Presented figures are probit average marginal effects. Regressions control for
the time effects. a Omitted category is Australian/New Zealander. b Omitted category
is nonemployed. ∗denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ∗∗denotes statistical
significance at the 5% level, and ∗∗∗denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table 9: Variation in health care seeking by predicted probability of under-reporting of mental
illness and other conditions
Diagnosis Drug use
GP visits MH treat. MH treat. GP visits MH treat. MH treat.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P̂ rob(URMI) 4.056
∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗ - 7.424∗∗∗ −0.373∗∗∗ -
(1.036) (0.063) (1.835) (0.129)
P̂ rob(UROther) - - 0.279 - - −0.258
(0.171) (0.259)
GP visits last year 0.671∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) (0.001) (0.001)
Mean(dep var) 10.747 0.175 0.175 10.747 0.175 0.175
Observations 1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618
Notes: See Appendix A.3 for the details on the sample. In Columns (1) and (4), the
dependent variable is the number of GP visits in the next 12 months from the survey date and
presented figures are OLS coefficients. In Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6), the dependent
variable takes the value 1 if an individual took prescription drugs for depression/anxiety or
visited a mental health professional in the next 12 months from the survey date and the value
0 otherwise and presented figures are probit average marginal effects. P̂ rob(URMI) is the
predicted probability of under-reporting mental illness diagnosis (in columns 1-2) or mental
health drug use (in columns 4-5), calculated using the estimates presented in Table 8.
P̂ rob(UROther) is the predicted probability of under-reporting other illness diagnosis (in
column 3) or other drug use (in column 6), calculated using the estimates presented in Table
B.3. Standard errors (presented in parentheses) are calculated using bootstrap method with
250 replications. ∗∗∗denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table 10: Variation in adherence to treatment by under-reporting of mental illness
0-3 months 4-6 months 7-9 months 10-12 months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Depression drugs
URMI −0.121∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038)
Mean (dep var) 0.798 0.733 0.714 0.654
B. Depression/Anxiety drugs
URMI −0.113∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
Mean (dep var) 0.809 0.745 0.724 0.680
Observations 738 738 738 738
Notes: The sample consists of “new” mental health patients who did not take any depression
drugs 7-12 months before the survey date and filled at least 3 scripts for depression drugs in
the past 6 months. URMI = 1 if an individual did not report depression or anxiety diagnosis
in the survey (despite filling at least 3 scripts for depression drugs). The dependent variable in
panel A (B) = 1 if an individual filled one or more script for depression (depression or
anxiety) drugs 0-3 (4-6, 7-9, 10-12) months after the survey date. The presented figures are
probit average marginal effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Regressions
control for the personal characteristics listed in Table 8 and year effects. ∗∗∗denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level.
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
A Data Appendix
A.1 Matching survey data to administrative records
A.1.1 Diagnoses
The drugs for different conditions are identified in the administrative data using the
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) Classification System, controlled by the World
Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology (WHOCC)26.
The following table provides the ATC codes related to the health conditions we analyze.
Disease/Health Condition ATC codes
Depression N06A
Cardiovascular disease All C codes, except for C10a
Diabetes A10
Notes : a C10 group of ATC codes consists of cholesterol lowering drugs. Individuals are
not asked whether they have been diagnosed with high blood cholesterol in The 45 and
Up Study.
A.1.2 Drugs
We match the drugs from the survey question on prescription drug use to the adminis-
trative records using a drug-specific ATC code. For example, ATC code for sertraline
is N06AB06, ATC code for citaloprim is N06AB04, and ATC code for venlafaxine is
N06AX16.
For depression drugs, both drug (active ingredient) name (e.g., sertraline) and brand name
(e.g. Zoloft) are mentioned in the survey drugs. Therefore, both patients who use a brand-
name drug and patients who use generic versions of the drug should report this in the
survey, especially that the names of most generic depression drugs contain the name of the
active ingredient. For example, generic sertraline drugs are called APO-Sertraline, Auro-
Sertraline 50, Chem mart Sertraline, Eleva 50, GenRx Sertraline, Sertra 50, Sertracor 50,
Sertraline AN, Sertraline Actavis, Sertraline Sandoz, Sertraline generic health, Sertraline-
DRLA, Setrona, Terry White Chemists Sertraline and Xydep 50. Having said that, we
may be somewhat over-estimating the under-reporting of depression drugs because of
the patients who use generic depression drugs that do not contain the active ingredient
26http://www.whocc.no/atc ddd index/
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in their name (like Xydep 50). Although the active ingredient is always listed on the
package, people may not pay attention to this information.
For some of the other drugs (most of the hypertension, cholesterol, and heartburn drugs),
however, there is only a brand name mentioned in the survey question and the name of
the drug (active ingredient) is not specified. Thus, individuals who use a generic version
of the drug may answer negatively about their use of these drugs. Consequently, the
under-reporting of the other drugs is likely to be over-estimated more so than the under-
reporting of depression drugs, and the true difference between the under-reporting rates
of depression and other drugs may be even larger than our estimate.
It is also important to note that the availability of generic alternatives is comparable
between the depression drugs and the other most commonly used drugs. For example,
there are on average 14 generic versions of the branded depression drugs (15 for Zoloft,
13 for Cipramil, and 14 for Efexor). The hypertension drugs have on average 9, choles-
terol drugs 14, and diabetes drugs 11 generic versions of the respective branded drugs.
Moreover, it is as common to include the active ingredient in the name of the generic
depression drugs (64% of the generic depression drugs on average) as it is for the other
drugs. For example, 67% of the generic hypertension drugs have the active ingredient
included in the name. The corresponding figures for the generic cholesterol and diabetes
drugs are 71% and 82%, respectively.
A.2 Dose
The PBS data have information on the strength of the drug, which we use to classify
drugs into low and high dose. We refer to the patient information sheets for each drug to
define “low” and “high” dose of a drug. For example, one of the depression drugs, Zoloft
(sertraline) comes in 50 mg and 100 mg tablets. According to the patient information
sheet, one 50 mg tablet is a usual starting dose, which can be increased gradually up to
200 mg a day if necessary.27 Thus, we define 50 mg as “low” dose and 100 mg as “high”
dose of Zoloft (sertraline).
Our definition of low and high dose relies on an assumption that individuals take one
unit (tablet/capsule) of the prescribed drug per day. Some patients may be prescribed
low-dose drugs but instructed by their doctor to take more than one unit of a drug per
day. In this case, we may misclassify some of the high-dose patients as low-dose patients.
To minimize this type of measurement error, we exclude: (1) patients who purchase more
than one pack of a low-dose drug at a time, and (2) patients who fill another script for the
same low-dose drug within 14 days from the first script (17% of all depression drug users
27http://www.betterhealth.vic.gov.au/bhcv2/bhcmed.nsf/pages/pfczolot/$File/pfczolot.pdf
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in total). We are do not have enough information to determine whether these patients
take a low dose or a high dose of a drug. Additionally, we exclude a small number of
patients (n=37) who took both a low dose and a high dose of the drug in the past month.
Another related issue is that patients may be prescribed a combination of multiple low
dose drugs for depression. In this case, some of the low-dose depression drug users (as per
our definition) may, in fact, take a high combined dose of depression drugs, which again
leads to measurement error. To address this issue, we check what proportion of low-dose
depression drug users are taking other depression drugs. We find that this proportion is
low (3%). Consequently, excluding these individuals does not affect our results.
A.3 Analysis of health care seeking: sample selection
In Subsection 4.3.2, we restrict the sample to the individuals who hold a health care
concession card, because we can observe the complete history of prescription drug use for
these individuals. More specifically, we limit the sample to the individuals who purchased
prescription drugs, other than for depression or anxiety, using a health care card both in
the year before and in the year after the survey date (41% of the sample).
In Tables 9 and B.4, to identify individuals in need of treatment, we further restrict the
sample to the individuals with a likely moderate or severe mental disorder, according to
the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10), which is based on the self-reported depres-
sive and anxiety symptoms. The scores of the Kessler scale vary from 10 (no psychological
distress) to 50 (severe psychological distress). A score of 25 or more indicates that an
individual is likely to have a moderate or severe mental disorder (Australian Bureau of
Statistics, 2012). We exclude individuals who have received mental health treatment in
the past 12 months, because we want to focus on “new” mental health patients. Individ-
uals who have died in hospital within 12 months from the survey date and the outliers of
GP visits (top 1%) are also excluded from the sample.
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B Additional tables and figures
Figure B.1: The 45 and Up Study survey question on diagnoses.
Notes : The left panel presents the question asked to women and the right panel the
question asked to men.
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Figure B.2: The 45 and Up Study survey question on prescription drug use.
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Table B.1: Sensitivity of results to alternative variable coding: under-reporting rates of diag-
noses
Under-reporting rate Difference from MI
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. na
Mental illness 0.344 (0.003) - - 30,191
Other conditions: 0.146 (0.001) −0.198∗∗∗ (0.003) 91,718
Cardiovascular diseasesb 0.155 (0.001) −0.188∗∗∗ (0.003) 78,191
Diabetes 0.093 (0.002) −0.251∗∗∗ (0.004) 13,527
Notes : In this table, we code individuals who do not report any health conditions in the
survey but do not state that they have no health conditions as missing (in Table 2, we
code them as non-reporting any conditions). Under-reporting rate is estimated as the
proportion of individuals observed purchasing drugs for a given condition from Sep 2005
to the survey date who do not report being diagnosed with this condition in the survey.
Standard errors (clustered at the individual level) in parentheses. aUnit of observation
is individual-condition. b Hypertension, heart disease, or stroke. ∗∗∗ indicates that the
under-reporting rate of a condition is different from the under-reporting rate of mental
illness at the 1% significance level.
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Table B.2: The over-reporting rates of prescription drugs for mental illness and other condi-
tions
Over-reporting rate Difference from MI
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. na
Mental illness (MI) 0.158 (0.005) - - 4,920
Other conditions: 0.148 (0.001) −0.010∗ (0.005) 114,402
Cardiovascular diseasesb 0.110 (0.001) −0.048∗∗∗ (0.005) 75,569
Diabetes 0.176 (0.004) 0.018∗∗∗ (0.007) 7,265
Other diseasesd 0.233 (0.002) 0.076∗∗∗ (0.006) 31,568
Notes : The sample consists of concessional individuals. Over-reporting rate is estimated
as the proportion of individuals reporting drug use for a given condition in the survey in
the past 4 weeks who did not purchase drugs for this condition in the past 3 months.
Standard errors (clustered at the individual level) in parentheses. aUnit of observation
is individual-condition. bHypertension, congestive high failure, high blood cholesterol,
or thrombosis. dHeartburn, gout, or thyroid problems. ∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate that the
over-reporting rate of a condition is different from the over-reporting rate of mental
illness at the 10% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table B.3: Variation in under-reporting rates of other conditions by demographic and socioe-
conomic characteristics.
Diagnosis Prescription drug use
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
(1) (2)
Age 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Male −0.053∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.006∗∗ (0.002)
Ancestrya:
European −0.013∗∗∗ (0.003) −0.010∗∗∗ (0.003)
Asian 0.018∗∗ (0.007) 0.060∗∗∗ (0.007)
African/ Middle Eastern 0.054∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.061∗∗∗ (0.009)
American 0.030∗ (0.016) 0.023 (0.015)
University degree −0.022∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.026∗∗∗ (0.004)
Employment statusb:
Self-employed −0.016∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.003 (0.005)
Employed for wages −0.034∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.004 (0.004)
Unemployed 0.024∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.055∗∗∗ (0.008)
Local area SES:
2nd quintile 0.003 (0.005) −0.003 (0.004)
3rd quintile −0.003 (0.004) −0.007∗ (0.004)
4th quintile −0.008∗ (0.005) −0.010∗∗ (0.004)
5th quintile −0.013∗∗∗ (0.005) −0.023∗∗∗ (0.004)
Mean (dep var) 0.169 0.136
Observationsc 94,188 108,045
Notes : In Column (1), the sample consists of individuals who purchased drugs for a
cardiovascular disease and/or diabetes at some time between the start date of the
administrative records (1 Sep 2005) and the survey date, and the dependent variable
takes the value 1 if an individual does not report ever being diagnosed with this
condition in the survey and the value 0 otherwise. In Column (2), the sample consists of
individuals who purchased drugs for a cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and/or other
conditions in the past month, and the dependent variable takes the value 1 if an
individual does not report using these drugs in the past 4 weeks in the survey and the
value 0 otherwise. Standard errors (clustered at the individual level) in parentheses.
Regressions control for the time effects. aOmitted category is Australian/New
Zealander. bOmitted category is nonemployed. cUnit of observation is
individual-condition. ∗ denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ∗∗ denotes
statistical significance at the 5% level, and ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1%
level.
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Table B.4: Variation in health care seeking by demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.
GP visits MH treatment
(1) (2)
GP visits last year 0.663∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
Age(demeaned) 0.050∗∗∗ (0.017) −0.002∗∗ (0.001)
Age(demeaned)2/100 −0.040 (0.100) - -
Male −0.475 (0.311) −0.072∗∗∗ (0.020)
Asian/African/Middle Eastern 1.253∗∗∗ (0.454) −0.068∗∗ (0.031)
University degree −0.402 (0.544) 0.024 (0.034)
Employment status:a
Self-employed −0.465 (0.744) −0.065 (0.051)
Employed for wages −0.120 (0.523) −0.044 (0.034)
Unemployed −0.080 (0.545) −0.006 (0.035)
Local area SES:
2nd quintile −0.500 (0.487) 0.064∗∗ (0.032)
3rd quintile 0.451 (0.459) 0.073∗∗ (0.030)
4th quintile 1.192∗∗ (0.490) 0.033 (0.033)
5th quintile 0.646 (0.536) 0.046 (0.035)
Mean(dep var) 10.747 0.175
Observations 1,618 1,618
Notes : See Appendix A.3 for the details on the sample. In Column (1), the dependent
variable is the number of GP visits in the next 12 months from the survey date. In
Column (2), the dependent variable takes the value 1 if an individual took prescription
drugs for depression/anxiety or visited a mental health professional in the next 12
months from the survey date and the value 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses.
aOmitted category is nonemployed. ∗ denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ∗∗
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at
the 1% level.
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Table B.5: Variation in adherence to treatment by under-reporting of mental illness, stricter
sample inclusion criteria
0-3 months 4-6 months 7-9 months 10-12 months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Depression drugs
URMI −0.188∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.142∗ −0.163∗∗
(0.062) (0.069) (0.077) (0.078)
Mean (dep var) 0.823 0.790 0.737 0.704
B. Depression/Anxiety drugs
URMI −0.187∗∗∗ −0.232∗∗∗ −0.128∗ −0.154∗∗
(0.061) (0.067) (0.077) (0.075)
Mean (dep var) 0.833 0.801 0.742 0.731
Observations 186 186 186 186
Notes: The sample consists of “new” mental health patients who did not take any depression
drugs 4-9 months before the survey date and filled at least 3 scripts for depression drugs in
the past 3 months. URMI = 1 if an individual reported neither depression nor anxiety
diagnosis in the survey. The dependent variable in panel A (B) = 1 if an individual filled one
or more script for depression (depression or anxiety) drugs 0-3 (4-6, 7-9, 10-12) months after
the survey date. The presented figures are probit average marginal effects. Standard errors are
presented in parentheses. Regressions control for the personal characteristics listed in Table 8
and year effects. ∗∗∗denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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